Theory Of Agency And Compliance
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Abstract
The article has as its core element the study of agency conflict through the general theory of Compliance. To this end, basic aspects of the structuring of incentive mechanisms are approached from the perspective of the scope of the regulations, in the face of possible conflicts of interest. The study is based on a deductive analysis of efficient mechanisms of positive and negative incentives, which enable the preservation of Institutional Integrity. The theme is highly relevant as there is a growing concern for reputation among companies, especially with regard to the observance of technical principles in their performance, at all levels of the organization (operational, managerial and strategic). In agency relationships, the principal and the agent incur positive monitoring and linkage costs (non-pecuniary and pecuniary) and, on several occasions, there will be some divergence between the agent's decisions and the decisions that would maximize the business interest. In this scenario, the adoption of incentives that seek to bring together the interests of the agent and the institutional objectives of the companies, skin in the game, becomes one of the main focuses of the study, as a way of making the compliance program more effective.
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